This paper examines the link sometimes made between the concept of dignity and substantive equality. The paper notes that dignity can have very different definitions.
attracted attention from commentators elsewhere, 13 and recent European directives on equality refer to the aim of protecting dignity.
14 Dignity is an unassailable value, 15 and is such a powerful notion that it may serve as an irrefutable argument. 16 It is also an ambiguous concept that conceals very different ideas on what constitutes a life with dignity. Despite this ambiguity, courts have resorted extensively to the concept. 17 It is a constitutional right in Germany, 18 Hungary, 19 Israel 20 and South Africa 21 among others, 22 while the European Convention on Human Rights' prohibition of "inhuman and degrading treatment" may be seen as a negative formulation of the right to dignity. 23 In some of these jurisdictions, dignity may serve as the springboard for a series of rights. 24 Dignity is stated as a guiding principle in other constitutions 25 and in international human rights law, 26 while some scholars discern a 31 The focus in this paper is on one specific use of dignity -as a value which can be used to "ground" or give direction to the concept of equality.
Canada and South Africa have detailed constitutional guarantees of equality.
Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms reads:
"15.
(1) Every individual is equal before the and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical disability."
Under Section 1 of the Charter, a measure which violates Section 15 may still be saved if it satisfies a proportionality test: restrictions on a right that can be shown to be necessary to pursue a legitimate state interest are constitutional. 31 The European Court of Human Rights dismissed a claim that the judicial decision to abolish the common law rule that a husband could not rape his wife was inconsistent with the principle that criminal laws are non-retrospective. The Court relied upon the serious threat to human dignity posed by rape in justifying its decision: R. v. United Kingdom (1995) 21 E.H.R.R. 363, para. 42. 32 Section 1 reads: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free
The Constitution of South Africa provides more guidance on equality. Section 9 states:
1. Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.
5. Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (2) is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair.
As in Canada, in principle a measure which violates Section 9 can be justified if it is satisfies a proportionality test. This paper examines how judges in Canada and South Africa have referred to the concept of dignity in developing equality law. It argues that, in many instances, the concept does not serve a useful legal purpose, and suggests that there are dangers in introducing the ambiguous concept of dignity into equality analysis.
The meaning of dignity
That dignity is difficult to define is a commonplace. 34 There is a danger in relying on a reflexive approach to dignity, which could cover almost any imaginable moral or ethical position and be no more than a "gut reaction" or an unarticulated reliance on what judges perceive to be socially desirable or acceptable.
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Dignity has a long history, with antecedents in religious thought 36 59 and a more materialistic conception: for Rawls, an individual's self-respect may be devalued if social goods are unequally distributed (unless an unequal distribution works to the benefit of the least advantaged in society). Such a view, rather than questioning the legitimacy of social protection measures, regards them as intimately linked to dignity.
60
A final, more materialistic, conception of dignity again relates it to social goods.
It eschews the subjective question of how a person feels; rather it asks whether social goods are equally distributed to everyone's material benefit. The spirit of this is best captured in international human rights texts, which invoke "human dignity" in the sense of our common humanity, 61 to ground human rights and equality. Such texts then condemn any "distinction, exclusion or restriction" that nullifies the "recognition, enjoyment or exercise" of rights in the "political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field" on the grounds specified in the international texts, such as sex, race, or "Rather …[the substantive approach to equality] focuses on whether it serves to advance or retard the equal enjoyment in practice of the rights and freedoms that are promised by the Constitution but have not already been achieved. It roots itself in a transformative constitutional philosophy which acknowledges that there are patterns of systemic advantage and disadvantage based on race and gender that need expressly to be faced up to and overcome if equality is to be achieved. In this respect, the context in which the measure operates, the structures of advantage and disadvantage it deals with, the impact it has on those affected by it and its overall effect in helping to achieve a society based on equality, non-racialism and non-sexism, become the important signifiers. "
Minister of Finance v. Van Heerden (CCT63/03) para. 142. Justice Sachs' approach to substantive equality in this passage does not refer to "dignity", though he later mentions it. He invokes it in different senses, including referring to the establishment of "national dignity" achieved through the creation of a just society: para. 145. In several equality cases discussed below, the differences among the judges may be explained by the emphasis that some give to dignity as autonomy and others to the more social or materialistic conceptions of dignity. 
The concept of dignity in equality law
Dignity, in all its varying iterations, can be used in different ways in an equality jurisprudence. 71 It may have a largely symbolic role, in emphasising the importance of equality and non-discrimination. Judges also may invoke dignity to identify the groups or classifications that equality jurisprudence should concern itself with and dignity may be used as a threshold mechanism for determining when a distinction becomes unacceptable.
In cases where a non-symbolic use of dignity is suggested, the concept often adds little to the legal analysis, which is based on more concrete notions (e.g. the need to combat particular forms of prejudice and stereotypes).
Canadian and South African judges have referred to the concept of dignity to expand the scope of their equality clauses. Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms comprises a comprehensive guarantee of equality, outlawing discrimination on a number of "enumerated grounds" (race, religion, sex, age, etc.).
Grounds "analogous" to these enumerated ones are also covered, and in Corbiere v.
Canada, the Supreme Court held that a ground is "analogous" if it is used in a way to impair human dignity.
The first inquiry is whether the distinction is made on the basis of an enumerated ground or a ground analogous to it. The answer to this 68 Grabham, supra note 6 at 654. 69 Greschner, supra note 6 at 312. 70 See Section 4 of this paper. 71 Other uses of dignity include extending discrimination law to cover harassment, or in deciding cases where rights conflict. Moon and Allen, supra note 13 at 631, 644; Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination, 88 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 1 (1999). Fredman also discusses the role of dignity in avoiding "levelling down": FREDMAN, supra note 11 at 18. In Corbiere, a statute denied Aborigines living off a reserve any voting rights relating to the reservation. The Supreme Court ruled that the status of being an "off reserve
Aborigine" was a ground analogous to those enumerated in Section 15 and therefore suspect. Like the enumerated grounds, it was a status that was often used in stereotypes and was not based on merit or personal circumstances but rather on a feature that is "immutable or changeable only at unacceptable cost to personal identity". 73 Finding there was a distinction based on an analogous ground was not the final step in determining whether there had been improper discrimination. 74 The next step was to examine whether the distinction was discriminatory in a substantive sense, that is, whether it impaired dignity as outlined in Law v Canada. 75 The majority held that the statute was discriminatory in the substantive sense, and was not justified under the limitations test in Section 1, because a complete ban on participation by off-reserve Aborigines participating in the reserve political process was more than a minimal impairment of the right.
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The Constitutional Court of South Africa also considers distinctions, beyond those enumerated in Section 9 of the South African constitution, if they are based on grounds, directly or indirectly, that have the potential to impair human dignity. 77 If there is a distinction based on such a ground, then the court must consider whether it is unfair. In deciding whether a specific distinction on an unenumerated ground is unfair, one of the factors that the court consider is whether the measure impairs the dignity of the persons affected.
78
While these courts mention dignity in expanding the scope of equality law, it is not clear that the concept does any work in furthering the courts' reasoning. The majority in Corbiere refers to the concept of dignity, but the substantive work in deciding whether "off reserve Aborigines" should have voting rights is done by deciding whether the ground for distinction is based on an immutable characteristic, or a personal characteristic that is difficult to change and which is used to stereotype some people harmfully. These concepts can be explained without referring to dignity. In Law the distinction was based on the enumerated ground of age. Under the third stage of the test, the Court found there was no violation of human dignity because young people (without disability or dependent children) had a better chance to obtain employment. There was no improper stereotyping of people under 35, but rather a distinction related to the reality that a young person has a better opportunity to replace the lost income. 86 While "dignity" provides the rubric, the concrete application of the third stage of the Law inquiry does the substantive work These Canadian and South African cases illustrate the ways in which judges typically refer to dignity at different stages of equality cases. Although "dignity" is largely symbolic, this is not so in all cases. As the next section demonstrates, when judges rely on dignity to provide the reasoning for a decision, then the inherent ambiguities and resulting dangers of the dignity concept become manifest.
The dangers of dignity in an equality jurisprudence
Judges decide equality based on specific articulations of ideas about stereotyping, personal characteristics and the like. "Dignity", on the other hand, is largely symbolic and leaves much room for unarticulated value assumptions to enter into judicial decision 83 "It may be said that the purpose of s. 15 (1) 88 For instance in the South African case, City Council of Pretoria v. Walker, the Council adopted a policy of not prosecuting residents of more deprived areas for non-payment of utilities charges, but did prosecute residents of more affluent (predominantly white) areas. The majority found this policy to affect white residents "in a manner which is at least comparably serious to an invasion of their dignity" (para. 82), but Justice Sachs, dissenting, "simply [could not] see how the complainant's rights were affected or his fundamental human dignity impaired by his receiving a summons to pay for something that was due." (para. 127). where their autonomy is more theoretical than real. This tension between dignity in the sense of autonomy (free choice) and dignity as consideration of needs and welfare reflects a significant disagreement in the understanding of the term.
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These cases highlight the possibility of tension between dignity understood as protecting autonomy (free choice) and dignity understand as protecting people's needs and welfare. Any human rights jurisprudence will require judges to make significant moral choices. 95 The competing interpretations of dignity -autonomy versus need and welfare -are set out, and the judicial choice between them can be analysed and criticised.
In other cases, the amorphous nature of dignity allows unarticulated value judgments to determine a decision.
The Canadian case of Gosselin is instructive. were probably better off in terms of access to employment. 99 Further, there was a relationship between the ground of distinction and social reality: there was a problem of youth unemployment based partly on the lack of skills among some young people. 100 As far as ameliorative purposes were concerned, McLachlin found this criterion to be neutral. 101 As to the nature of the interests, McLachlin held that the legislature was trying to help younger people to develop skills and was to "promote the self-sufficiency and autonomy of young welfare recipients". 102 She concluded that the statute did not impair the claimant's dignity.
The dissenting judges dealt very differently with the third principle of the Law test. Justice Michel Bastarache gave a detailed overview of the claimant's circumstances:
she had to move house frequently, sometimes ate at soup kitchens or her mother's home, and suffered a string of medical problems. 103 He noted that the social assistance scheme was premised on the problem of youth unemployment, indicating young people who suffered pre-existing disadvantage. 104 He observed an underlying assumption in the legislation that young people needed "punitive measures" to encourage them to take up training opportunities. 105 Because the law expected young people to survive on an income below the official subsistence level, exposing them to the threat of "deep poverty", 106 which might lead to malnutrition or even more dire circumstances, 107 the dissenters found a violation of Section 15. Both the majority and dissenters said they were addressing the same question, namely whether a reasonable young person under the age of 30 would experience the same impairment of dignity as an older citizen when denied subsistence benefits.
108
There are similar issues in another age discrimination case from Canada: at the head, 110 and to limit teachers to use of force only when restraining a child or removing a child from the classroom.
111
The majority found there was a correspondence between the circumstances and needs of children and the measure, when viewed in the overall context of state policy on corporal punishment, so that there was nothing arbitrary or demeaning in enforcing it.
The court said:
I am satisfied that a reasonable person acting on behalf of a child, apprised of the harms of criminalization that s. 43 avoids, the presence of other governmental initiatives to reduce the use of corporal punishment, and the fact that abusive and harmful conduct is still prohibited by the criminal law, would not conclude that the child's dignity has been offended in the manner contemplated by s. 15(1). Children often feel a sense of 108 Gosselin highlights the concern that dignity (whether related to autonomy or self-respect) may suggest an interpretation of equality which is more sensitive to symbolic violations of dignity rather than unequal distribution of material benefits. (I am grateful to Sonia Lawrence of Osgoode Hall Law School for this point.) The Kantian sense of dignity is "unconditional" and so in one sense is immune to being impaired by changes in material circumstances: Moreau, supra note 67 at 295. In the language of political philosophers, it may focus too much on recognition and not on redistribution (NANCY FRASER and after children 115 (though he may also have been influenced by the undesirable spectre of releasing large numbers of prisoners in a society worried about crime rates 116 ). In upholding this decision, the Court observed that a constitutional ban on unfair discrimination reflected the constitutional purpose of achieving "establishment of a society in which all human beings will be accorded equal dignity and respect regardless of their membership of particular groups" 117 but found no such discrimination. It said that the jailed fathers had had their liberty curtailed through conviction and not by the Presidential Act. While they were disadvantaged in being denied a benefit offered to mothers in jail, they could still apply for remission. Therefore, according to the majority found that the measure had not impaired the dignity of the jailed fathers. 118 Justice
Johann Kriegler dissented. He maintained that the State was relying on a stereotype about women's position in society to justify the distinction in the Presidential decision. Relying on a sex-based generalization was itself an affront to dignity. 119 These cases suggest that the concept of dignity is sufficiently broad to allow judges, on unarticulated norms, to decide difficult issues. This may reinforce stereotypes and prejudices rather than combat them.
Conclusion
The temptation to link dignity with equality is strong. Equality is a difficult concept to apply, which leads some writers to invoke dignity, 120 but dignity has similar problems. In many cases discussed here, the real work has been done by concepts such as the need to combat prejudice and stereotypes and to recognise the needs of members of disadvantaged groups. In some cases, "dignity" has a role to play but the malleability of the concept makes it controversial. 121 Its malleable nature means that dignity, rather than resolving any ambiguities about equality, creates further problems.
Should we then jettison the concept of dignity, given that it often seems redundant or controversial? It may be too late. The concept may already be so embedded in case law and legislation that it must be addressed. 122 If so, we will have to recognise its malleable nature and consider how to approach it.
Constitutional texts and jurisprudence are replete with concepts as vague as they are inspiring. Judges have a role to play in giving more detailed content to these concepts. Even where the norms underpinning a notion of dignity are spelled out, people may reasonably differ on how dignity should be understood. The South African and
Canadian decisions show different understandings of dignity at work. Some judges respect dignity by stressing the role of free choice, e.g. the free choice of an individual not to take advantage of a legal status such as marriage. Other judges may see the idea of free choice as more problematic and believe respecting dignity requires that people be given the protection they need. These are value choices judges will have to make (and make explicit) if they are to flesh out the content of abstract concepts. In identifying different interpretations of the idea of dignity (as well as equality), judges should make public and clarify the normative basis for the law, and in so doing invite further public, political and academic commentary on the normative basis of the law.
If we must use the concept of dignity in equality law, then we need to avoid a focus on how someone feels, which makes it too easy for unreflective value judgments to influence the decision. In defining dignity, the importance of autonomy 124 should be recognized, but the warning of the dissenting judges in Walsh and Robinson should be remembered, that autonomy is not a practical reality for everyone. The full realization of autonomy frequently requires attention to the forms of hierarchy and disadvantage that exist in society. The specific factors listed by Justice Iacobucci and Justice Sachs quoted in Section 2 above, may be useful in tackling problems of hierarchy and patterns of disadvantage (in the sense of systematic exclusion from community benefits). 125 There are different ways in which a hierarchy may be developed (prejudice, stereotyping, unequal distribution of resources, etc.). 126 A substantive equality jurisprudence must 124 Or self determination: see Moon and Allen, supra note 13, at 627. 125 See also Moon and Allen, supra note 13, at 648. 126 Reaume identifies three types of harm to her specific conception of dignity that are relevant to an equality analysis: prejudice, stereotyping and "exclusion from benefits or opportunities that are particularly significant because access to them constitute part of the minimum conditions for a life with dignity." Supra note 11, at 672.
confront those mechanisms that promote hierarchy and instead promote the equal enjoyment of community benefits. Some judges have taken this difficult route, -not shrouding their value judgements behind the cloak of dignity, and instead focusing on real questions of disadvantage. If dignity is to be invoked, then it must be tied to these specific questions of disadvantage.
This paper does not argue against the right to dignity as such, much less against a right not to be subject to inhuman and degrading treatment. It argues that dignity may not be a helpful addition to the development of an equality jurisprudence. If judges refer to the idea of dignity, they should not use it as shorthand for what they see as socially acceptable standards but rather should spell out the norms underpinning their conception of dignity. When used to expand the scope of equality law, then the invocation of dignity may do little harm; the same is not true when treated as a factor to limit equality claims.
Then, unless firmly anchored to ideas about prejudice, stereotypes and disadvantage, it may hinder the quest for substantive equality.
